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I. Introduction
T he Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or the Act) permits "any person" to
obtain access to all federal agency records, subject only to nine enumerated
exemptions.' This unprecedented right of access to government documents reflects
the importance of information in a democracy. As James Madison wrote: "A
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm
themselves with the power which knowledge gives."'
FOIA is intended to provide the citizenry with the knowledge necessary to
govern. Although there is no single statement in the Act's legislative history of the
necessary extent of that knowledge, it is clear that Congress envisioned at least
three roles of the electorate for which the Act was designed to guarantee access to
government information. First and most important, the FOIA plainly facilitates
the watchdog function of the public over the government: The public must have
access to the government information necessary to ensure that government officials
act in the public interest. "This watchdog function," writes Glenn Dickinson,
"was perhaps the principal inspiration for the FOIA and has remained its symbolic
central pillar."'
Second, in addition to empowering the citizenry with the knowledge necessary
to evaluate the conduct of government officials, the FOIA was intended to assure
the public's access to government information concerning public policy.4 "Citi-
zens enjoy the benefits or suffer the consequences of public policy, so they should
be able to draw their own conclusions regarding the effectiveness of that policy.
The FOIA allows them to undertake this independent evaluation." 5 Third, the
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988). The nine exemptions permit an agency to protect from
disclosure information including records pertaining to national security, internal agency rules,
matters exempted from disclosure by other federal acts, trade secrets, inter- or intra-agency memo-
randa (which includes the executive privilege), personnel and medical files, records compiled for
law enforcement purposes, matters concerning the operation of financial institutions, and geologi-
cal information. Id. §§ 552(b)(l)-(9).
2. Letter from James Madison to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822) in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910).
3. Glenn Dickinson, Comment, The Supreme Court's Narrow Reading of the Public Interest Served by
the Freedom of Information Act, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 197 (1990).
4. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONC., 2D SEss., FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCEBOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES 36, 37 (Comm. Print
1974) [hereinafter FOIA SOURCEBOOK]; H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted
in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra at 27, 33.
5. Dickinson, supra note 3, at 197.
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authors of the FOIA wanted to ensure that the government would not secretly
create or enforce laws or administrative regulations. To this end, the Act is de-
signed to guarantee that "those against whom administrative precedents operated
would know in advance the nature of those precedents." 6
Taken together, these three functions mark the broad purpose of the Act which,
according to the United States Supreme Court, is "to open agency action to the
light of public scrutiny." 7 The unanimous Court wrote in 1989 that the Act
"indeed focuses on the citizens' right to be informed about 'what their government
is up to.' . . . FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's activities
be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny .... ",
Following passage of the FOIA in 1966,' historians and journalists-the princi-
pal users of the Act-did exactly what Congress had intended: They used the
Act to expose government activities to the sharp eye of public scrutiny. Exposes
appeared on topics ranging from misuse of government funds by colleges and
universities to environmental hazards resulting from radioactive wastes. 10 Authors
based hundreds of books and articles on information received through FOIA
disclosures. Requests were still relatively few, however, and the costs of administer-
ing the Act were manageable. For example, in 1966 costs were estimated at only
$50,000.11
By 1981, FOIA requests had overwhelmed federal agencies. Not only had the cost
to taxpayers of responding to these requests reached $50 to $250 million per year,
1 2
but the beneficiaries were not those originally intended by the Act's sponsors. Corpo-
rations and litigants were using the FOIA extensively as a means of acquiring informa-
tion about private parties that was held within the governmental documentary ware-
house. Businesses had learned that the FOIA could be used to gather information
about competitors that could be used to gain a commercial advantage. In fact, the
vast majority of the FOIA requests were made by business executives or their law-
yers,1 3 who, in the words of Judge Patricia Wald, "astutely discerned the business
value of the information which government obtains from industry while performing
its licensing, inspecting, regulating, and contracting functions."
1 4
6. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2).
7. United States Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters Comm'n for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
772 (1989) (quoting Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)).
8. Id. at 773-74 (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1983)).
9. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
10. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks
of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 660-61 (1984).
11. Edward C. Schmults, U.S. Deputy Attorney General, FOIAct Classic Example of Law That Needs
Improving, reprinted in Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on S. 587, S. 1235, S. 1247, S. 1730, and S. 1751
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 1 st Sess. 880 (1981)
[hereinafter 1981 Senate Hearings].
12. Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of Information Act Dispute Resolution, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 21
(1988).
13. 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 159-62 (testimony ofJonathan Rose, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Policy, Department ofJustice); id. at 776 (statement ofJack Landau, Executive
Director, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press).
14. Wald, supra note 10, at 665-66.
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Such an extension of the FOIA violates the purpose of the Act and transforms
it "into a vehicle serving purely private interests, to the detriment of its intended
public interest. "5 As a result, the government has spent billions of taxpayer dollars
responding to requests that seek no information "about what the Government is
up to." The privacy rights and confidentiality interests of individuals and organi-
zations who disclose information to the government are violated when the govern-
ment complies with requests for information about competitors rather than about
the government. The discovery process in civil litigation, as well as judicial efforts
to both improve the speed and efficiency and reduce the costs of trials, is circum-
vented. Voluntary compliance with government efforts to collect information
about industries, products, and markets is thwarted. Responses to meaningful
FOIA requests that seek information about government activities are delayed.
The United States Supreme Court took the first step toward stemming the
widespread abuse of the FOIA with its unanimous decision in United States Depart-
ment ofJustice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. 16 In the context of evaluat-
ing the contours of Exemption 7(C), which excludes from disclosure records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes" to the extent that the produc-
tion of such [materials] . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy," 1 7 the Court articulated three principles for
evaluating future claims. First, "whether disclosure of a private document under
Exemption 7(C) is warranted must turn on the nature of the requested document
and its relationship to 'the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act "to
open agency action to the light of public scrutiny."' ' '8
The Supreme Court's second principle focused on citizens' legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy. The Court found that when the information sought concerns a
"private citizen" and "when the information is in the Government's control as
a compilation, rather than as a record of 'what the Government is up to,' the
privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) is in fact at its apex while the FOIA-
based public interest in disclosure is at its nadir."19
Finally, the Supreme Court in Reporters Committee held "that when the request
seeks no 'official information' about a Government agency, but merely records
that the Government happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is 'unwar-
ranted.' "20 In short, the release of information possessed by the government about
private citizens constitutes an unwarranted invasi6n of those citizens' privacy; such
information, therefore, is not subject to disclosure under Exemption 7(C).
Lower courts immediately extended the Court's three principles in Reporters
15. The Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1988) (statement of Stephen J. Markman, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice) [hereinafter 1988 Senate Hearings].
16. 489 U.S. 749, 772 (1989).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
18. 489 U.S. at 772 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976),
quoting Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974)).
19. Id. at 780.
20. Id.
The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to Know 45
Committee to a wide variety of Section 7(C) cases," as well as to cases involving
FOIA's other personal privacy exemption, Exemption 6, which excludes personnel
and medical files from disclosure.22 The Supreme Court unanimously recognized
this extension in United States Department of State v. Ray." Presented with a claim
that the State Department had violated the FOIA by redacting the names of
Haitian refugees who had been interviewed by U.S. embassy personnel, the Court
held that "[tihe addition of the redacted identifying information would not shed
any additional light on the Government's conduct of its obligation," 24 and there-
fore reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision ordering release of
the redacted information.25
This dramatic interpretation of the Act's two personal privacy exemptions-
that as a categorical matter "when the request seeks no 'official information' about
a Government agency, but merely records that the Government happens to be
storing, the invasion of privacy is 'unwarranted' " 26 -is an important step towards
limiting the misuse of the FOIA. Its logic and force applies not only to disclosures
affecting personal privacy interests, however, but to all disclosures under the Act.
Moreover, although exemptions under the FOIA are permissive, not mandatory,
agencies should be prohibited from disclosing information about a private individ-
ual other than the requester, unless that information sheds light on "what the
Government is up to."
In order to achieve the Act's intended purpose, the "official information" test
should be the touchstone for disclosure. After all, "the FOIA's central purpose
is to ensure that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public
scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the ware-
house of the Government be so disclosed." 27 Such a policy reflects not only the
constitutionally protected right to privacy, but also protects important societal
interests such as the effectiveness and efficiency of the judicial system; law enforce-
ment and administrative regulations; the timely disclosure of appropriate informa-
tion under the FOIA; and, the efficient and cost-effective operation of the govern-
ment.
This article argues for expanding application of the Supreme Court's "central
purpose" test beyond Exemptions 7(C) and 6, and beyond FOIA exemptions
21. See, e.g., SafeCard Services, Inc. v. SEC., 926 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1991); KTVY-TV v.
United States, 919 F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1990); Fitzgibbon v.CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Halloran v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1989); Fitzgibbon v. United States Secret Serv.,
747 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1990); Albuquerque Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 726
F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1989); Wagner v. FBI, No. 90-1314-LFO, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7506
(D.D.C. June 4, 1991).
22. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. National Aeronautics & Space Admin., 920 F.2d 1002 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446
(D.C. Cir. 1989); National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990).
23. 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991).
24. Id. at 543.
25. Id.
26. 489 U.S. at 780.
27. Id. at 774.
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altogether. Only information that will serve the "central purpose" of FOIA-
ensuring that "the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public
scrutiny" 2 -should ever be subject to disclosure under the FOIA. Part I of this
article analyzes the creation and use of the FOIA, highlighting the government's
use of the FOIA exemptions to justify nondisclosure. Part II examines judicial
interpretations of the purpose of the FOIA, including recent Justice Department
guidelines aimed at limiting the use of FOIA to its intended beneficiaries. Part III
recommends a re-examination of the FOIA focusing on its "central purpose."
This approach would limit the presumption in favor of disclosure to records con-
cerning governmental action. If a desired record is not within FOIA's "central
purpose," courts need never decide the application of the Act's exemptions.
I. The Creation and Use of the FOIA
A. THE CREATION OF THE FOIA
President Lyndon Johnson signed the original Freedom of Information Act into
law on July 4, 1966, proclaiming that
[a] democracy works best when the people have all the information that the security of
the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions
which can be revealed without injury to the public interest.29
Citizens and lawmakers alike were concerned about bureaucratic unaccount-
ability, and Congress responded with an act that would open government "to the
light of public scrutiny." 30 Prior to passage of the FOIA, the Administrative
Procedure Act31 (APA) governed information requests. The APA stated that all
public records could be inspected by "persons properly and directly concerned"
with the subject matter unless the records were held confidential "for good
cause." 32 But "good cause" was a simple standard that allowed federal agencies
sufficient discretion to circumvent even the minimal inspection principle.33
In 1966, Congress amended the APA with the Freedom of Information Act.
34
The 1966 Act required notice of agency actions, including organization, proce-
dures, and policies of agencies as well as final opinions rendered, and permitted
the public to request records from "each agency.'"'" The Act, as amended in
1967, also provided nine categories of exempted information: records pertaining to
28. Id.
29. Statement of the President Upon Signing Bill Revising Public Information Provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, July 4, 1966, 2 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 895 (July 11, 1966).
30. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
31. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, repealed by Freedom of Information Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
32. Id. § 3(c).
33. ALFRED C. AMAN & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISrATIVE LAW 617 (1993) (citing Act ofJune
11, 1946, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946)).
34. Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b), (c) (1988)).
35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)-(c), 80 Stat. at 383.
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national security, internal agency rules, matters exempted from disclosure by
other federal acts, trade secrets, inter- or intra-agency memoranda (which includes
the executive privilege), personnel and medical files, records compiled for law
enforcement purposes, matters concerning the operation of financial institutions,
and geological information.
3 6
These exemptions, while aimed at limiting the federal agencies' discretion, soon
proved so broad that agencies could force any record into one of the exemptions.
Although the federal judiciary decreed that disclosure would be "the guiding star
...in construing the Act,"" the Act lacked power and was further undermined
by an inconsistent legislative history: the Senate report favored disclosure while
the House version was much more restrictive."8 The culture of secrecy in Washing-
ton that the Cold War aroused remained largely untouched by the FOIA. 39
Early decisions permitted agencies to apply the exemptions broadly. For exam-
ple, in Frankel v. Securities and Exchange Commission,"4 plaintiff shareholders of Occi-
dental Petroleum requested a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) report
of a nonpublic investigation into the corporation. 4' The SEC denied the request,
claiming that the records were "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes" 2 under FOIA Exemption 7, even though the investigation had ended.43
The court upheld this claim, reasoning that if the files were obtainable, future law
enforcement efforts by the agency could be seriously hindered. 4
Another example of the breadth of the exemptions arose in Environmental Protec-
tion Agency v. Mink.45 Congresswoman Mink and thirty-two other Representatives
had requested that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) release recom-
mendations made to President Richard Nixon regarding the advisability of under-
ground nuclear testing.46 EPA claimed that the documents were Top Secret or
Secret and were exempt from the FOIA under the "national security" exemp-
tion.47 In upholding EPA's claim, the Court stated that since the documents were
so classified, they were per se nondisclosable. 4" The Court denied in camera review,
broadly deferring instead to the executive branch.49 In a vigorous dissent, Justice
Douglas objected to the "carte blanche" 50 granted the executive branch without
36. Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) (codified as amended 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)).
37. Consumers Union of United States v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 800 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
38. See KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 69 (1972).
39. See Harold C. Relyea, Introduction to Symposium. The FOIA a Decade Later, 39 PuB. ADMIN. REV.
310 (1979). See also AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 33, at 618.
40. 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
41. Id. at 813-14.
42. Id. at 817.
43. Id. at 813.
44. Id. at 817.
45. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
46. Id. at 75.
47. Id. at 81.
48. Id. at 83.
49. Id. at 84.
50. Id. at 110.
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any "discernible relation to the interests sought to be protected by subsection
(b)(1) of the Act.'' 5
In 1974, Congress responded to these and other examples of broad agency
interpretations of the FOIA's nine exemptions with amendments to the FOIA that
unequivocally mandated greater agency disclosure. With the Watergate conspir-
acy still lingering, Congress reflected the national distrust by quickly moving to
open executive branch files to the public. Congress passed a bill amending the
FOIA,52 and then easily overrode President Gerald Ford's veto.53
The 1974 amendments attempted to curb discretionary nondisclosure. Records
were to be segregated so that agencies could not classify entire categories of records
as exempt.54 The amendments clarified the national security exemption," requir-
ing classification criteria and providing for in camera review by courts.56 Congress
enumerated six specific concerns for investigatory law enforcement records. 7 The
amendments also provided uniform fee schedules (and fee waivers if the informa-
tion "benefit[s] the general public'), 5 8 timetables for responses to requests,
59
fee-shifting to prevailing litigants whose requests are denied,6" and disciplinary
legal action against officials found to be "arbitrarily or capriciously" withholding
requested records.61 Deference to the executive branch declined in importance as
the amendments strengthened the FOIA and required agencies to disclose or
provide a specific exemption.
Nevertheless, after slight alterations in 197662 and a failed attempt in 1981, Con-
gress once again amended the FOIA in 1986 as part of its Anti-Drug Abuse Act63
and broadened Exemption 7 to exclude further law enforcement information. This
move directly contradicted Congress's attempts to force agency disclosure. While
the Act no longer reflects the "disclosure at any cost" belief that resonated from
Watergate, however, it still favors disclosure well beyond the 1966 Act.
B. How THE FOIA WORKS
Obtaining information from the federal government under the FOIA is remark-
ably simple, at least in theory. "Any person" may request information, including
foreign citizens, corporations and foreign governments.65 The FOIA is intended
51. Id.
52. Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561, 1561-64 (1974).
53. See FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at 396-97. The House voted 371-31 to override while
the Senate followed, 65-27.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988) (corresponds to Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(c) (1974)).
55. Id. § 552(b)(1).
56. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
57. Id. § 552(b)(7).
58. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1982) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(A)(iii) (1988)).
59. Id. §§ 552(a)(6)(A)-(B) (1988).
60. Id. § 552(a)(4)(E).
61. Id. § 552(a)(4)(F).
62. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976).
63. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
64. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(7), (c), (a)(4)(A).
65. 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 n.157 (1989).
The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to Know 49
to provide access to "agency records": documents created or obtained by an
executive agency and within the control of the agency.66 Congress and the Judiciary
are not covered by the Act.67 A FOIA request must "reasonably describe" the
records sought and must comport with published agency procedural regulations. 68
The Act establishes a narrow window of response time for agencies. The FOIA
gives requesters the right to seek immediate judicial review when an agency does
not respond to a request within ten business days. 69 Practically, the stringent time
limit does not mean that a final response will be forthcoming within ten days;
courts have found compliance if an agency exercises 'due diligence" in processing
requests and is not "lax overall in meeting its obligations under the Act with all
available resources." 70 This standard has resulted in a defacto reasonableness test
for agency action in retrieving records.71
Agencies must provide records subject to the FOIA to requesters unless the
records are specifically exempted from disclosure.72 The Act provides nine exemp-
tions from FOIA's disclosure provisions, including records pertaining to national
security, internal agency rules, matters exempted from disclosure by other federal
acts, trade secrets, inter- or intra-agency memoranda (which includes the executive
privilege), personnel and medical files, records compiled for law enforcement
purposes, matters concerning the operation of financial institutions, and geological
information.7" These exemptions are permissive: agencies are free to withhold
information falling within one of these nine exemptions, but there is no require-
ment that they do so.
Requesters may be required to pay the costs of copying and searching for agency
records. The 1986 amendments revised the fee guidelines to include searching, re-
viewing, and duplicating expenses. 7 4 Depending on the intended use of the records,
some or all of these fees may be imposed.73 Agencies may also waive fees on a case-by-
case basis consistent with the congressional policy of liberally granting fee waivers.
7 6
C. USE OF THE FOIA
Such a liberal presumption in favor of disclosure is not without its costs. Justice
Antonin Scalia, then a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, referred to
66. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
67. Id. § 552(0.
68. Id. § 552(a)(3).
69. This is the statutory time limit, absent "unusual circumstances." Id. § 552(a)(6).
70. Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
See also AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 33, at 633.
71. SeeWeisberg v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also
H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6271-72.
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
73. Id. §§ 552(b)(l)-(9).
74. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1803, 100 Stat. 3207, 3249-50 (1986).
75. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)-(iii). For example, if the records are for commercial use, the
requester may be charged for all three types of costs. If the use is noncommercial, only search and
duplication costs may be assessed. If the use is for educational, scientific, or news, only duplication
costs can be charged. See ALLEN R. ADLER, USING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: A STEP BY STEP
GUIDE 7 (1990) (explaining the practical steps toward gaining a fee waiver).
76. ADLER, supra note 75, at 5.
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the FOIA as "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences, the
Sistine Chapel of Cost Benefit Analysis Ignored." Justice Scalia's statement
aptly describes the onslaught of FOIA requests after 1974. Clearinghouses and
commercial services appeared for FOIA requesters, and the costs skyrocketed,
with the government spending between $50 and $250 million a year on processing
requests.78 The fiscal ramifications of litigating appeals of FOIA denials are so
widespread that they cannot even be estimated confidently.79 The Department of
Health and Human Services alone processed over 121,000 FOIA requests in 1987
at a cost of over $8.1 million.8" During the same period, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation processed more than 60,000 FOIA requests, released nearly 800,000
pages of documents, and handled 2,000 administrative appeals from denials of
FOIA requests, at a cost of over 600 employee years."' The fee waiver provisions
of the FOIA have thus far blocked efforts by the government to recoup the signifi-
cant costs associated with FOIA requests and litigation.
Closely related to escalating costs, the burgeoning number of FOIA requests has
led to significant delays in agency responses to disclosure requests. For example, in
1987 the Central Intelligence Agency responded to FOIA requests on average
within 45 days, 2 more than four times the limit set forth in the FOIA.8" The
Department of Justice failed to meet the 20-day time limit for responding to
administrative appeals of FOIA denials in 75 percent of its 1987 appeals.
84
Furthermore, the intended beneficiaries of the Act were not its principal request-
ers. A General Accounting Office survey found that "only one out of every twenty
FOIA requests were [sic] made by ajournalist, scholar or author. In contrast, four
out of five requests were made by business executives or their lawyers . . ,85
In 1988, Assistant Attorney General Stephen J. Markman testified before the
Subcommittee on Technology and the Law of the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary:
Today, a typical FOIA scenario is not, as [originally] envisioned by the Congress, the
journalist who seeks information about the development of public policy when he will
shortly publish for the edification of the electorate. Rather, it is the corporate lawyer
seeking business secrets of a client's competitors; the felon attempting to learn who
informed against him; the drug trafficker trying to evade the law; the foreign requester
seeking a benefit that our citizens cannot obtain from his country; the private litigant
who, constrained by discovery limitations, turns to the FOIA to give him what a trial
77. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1982,
at 14, 15.
78. Grunewald, supra note 12, at 21.
79. Id. at 22.
80. Memorandum from Otis R. Bowen, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services to
OPDIV and STAFFDIV Heads (Apr. 21, 1988), reprinted in 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 206
(statement of Russell M. Roberts).
81. 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 3 (statement of Stephen J. Markman).
82. Id. at 186 (statement of John H. Wright, Information and Privacy Coordinator, CIA).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6).
84. 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 121 (response to questions for the hearing record by
Stephen J. Markman).
85. Wald, supra note 10, at 665.
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court will not. And as if these uses do not diverge enough from the Act's original purpose,
it is the public-the intended beneficiary of the whole scheme-who bears nearly the
entire financial burden of honoring those requests while often reaping virtually none of
the benefits from them.
86
For example, over 85 percent of 33,000 annual FOIA requests to the Food and
Drug Administration are from regulated industries or their representatives seeking
information on competitors.87 Of the 121,000 FOIA requests received by the
Department of Health and Human Services during 1987, three-quarters were
from "commercial use requesters. "88
Similarly, lawyers quickly realized that FOIA requests were quicker and less
complicated than civil discovery.89 The Deputy Attorney General reported at the
Second Circuit Judicial Conference that more than half of FOIA requests to the
Justice Department Antitrust Division were by actual or potential litigants in
private antitrust suits.90 The Department of Defense has testified before Congress
"that out of 57,000 requests annually, more than half came from businessmen
or their lawyers interested in supplementing discovery in litigation over defense
contracts.' "91
The unintended beneficiaries of the Act have realized a windfall as a result of
the important purposes of the FOIA. These parties have stretched the FOIA
beyond its intended reach, costing the federal government hundreds of millions
of dollars. Judge Patricia Wald has written: "The Act has been charged with
turning agencies into information brokers between companies pursuing each
other, rather than acting as a window for public assessment of how government
conducts itself.'92
II. Judicial Interpretations of the Purpose of the FOIA
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PURPOSE OF THE FOIA
FOIA litigation has focused primarily not on the Act's central purpose but on
the nine exemptions from disclosure. While the central purpose rationale applies
86. 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 37 (statement of StephenJ. Markman) (footnote omitted).
87. Wald, supra note 10, at 666 n.73 (citation omitted).
88. 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 202 (statement of Russell M. Roberts).
89. Wald, supra note 10, at 66465 (footnotes omitted).
90. Id. at 667 n.76.
91. Id. at 671 (footnote omitted).
[C]ompanies complain bitterly about agency disclosure of technical cost and management details
that are contained in their bids for government contracts, while universities decry the disclosure of
details contained in their research grant proposals. A chemical company representative told of a
request, presumably by a competitor acting through lawyers and consulting firm intermediaries,
for information which he claimed could be used to deduce production capabilities, construction cost
fixtures, and critical operating data. Multinational drug manufacturers are said to prefer researching
and developing innovative drugs abroad for fear that processes still undergoing testing here will be
prematurely disclosed under the FOIA.
Id. at 668-69 (footnotes omitted).
92. Id. at 667 (footnote omitted).
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to all of the Act's exemptions, the Supreme Court has recently ruled on the proper
scope of the FOIA in cases involving two of the nine exemptions defined in 5
U.S.C. § 552(b).
1. The Exemption 7(C) Context
Exemption 7(C) excludes records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes, "to the extent that the production of such [materials] ... could reason-
ably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
93
Prior to 1986, Exemption 7(C) applied to disclosures that "would constitute" an
invasion of privacy. In 1986, Congress amended Exemption 7(C), substituting
"could reasonably be expected to constitute" for the phrase "would constitute." 94
In the Supreme Court's view, the amendment represented a considered congres-
sional effort
"to ease considerably a Federal law enforcement agency's burden in invoking [Exemp-
tion 7]" .... [in determining the impact on personal privacy from disclosure of law
enforcement records or information, the stricter standard of whether such disclosure
"would" constitute an unwarranted invasion of such privacy gives way to the more
flexible standard of whether such disclosure "could reasonably be expected to" constitute
95
such an invasion.
The United States Supreme Court in United States Department ofJustice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press96 enunciated three principles to govern application
of the 7(C) exemption. The case arose out of requests made by CBS and the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press for information concerning the
criminal records of four individuals, only so far as it contained " 'matters of
public record.' " The records, referred to by the Court as "rap sheets," contain
"certain descriptive information, such as date of birth and physical characteristics,
as well as a history of arrests, charges, convictions, and incarcerations of the
subject.' "
The Supreme Court, overturning the appellate court's decision, ruled unani-
mously that
whether disclosure of a private document under Exemption 7(C) is warranted must turn
on the nature of the requested document and its relationship to "the basic purpose of the
Freedom of Information Act 'to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.' -99
... [The Act] indeed focuses on the citizens' right to be informed about "what their gov-
ernment is up to.". . . [T]he FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's
activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private
citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
94. Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, § 1802, 1803, 100 Stat. 3207-48, 3207-49.
95. Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 n.9
(1989) (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. 31,424 (1986)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 757 (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 752.
99. Id. at 772-74 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976), quoting
Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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Where a requester seeks information about a private person rather than about
the conduct of a government agency or employee, that paramount interest is not
served. According to the Court, "in the typical case in which one private citizen
is seeking information about another-the requester does not intend to discover
anything about the conduct of the agency that has possession of the requested
records." 0 The response to such a request, a unanimous Supreme Court wrote,
"would not shed any light on the conduct of any Government agency or official." 1' 1
The Supreme Court quoted approvingly fromJudge Starr's dissent in the appellate
court case:
We are now informed that many federal agencies collect items of information on
individuals that are ostensibly matters of public record. For example, Veterans Ad-
ministration and Social Security records include birth certificates, marriage licenses,
and divorce decrees (which may recite findings of fault); the Department of Housing
and Urban Development maintains data on millions of home mortgages that are
presumably "public records" at county clerks' offices.... Under the majority's
approach, in the absence of state confidentiality laws, there would appear to be a
virtual per se rule requiring all such information to be released. The federal govern-
ment is thereby transformed in one fell swoop into the clearinghouse for highly per-
sonal information, releasing records on any person, to any requester, for any purpose.
This Congress did not intend."°2
The Court repeatedly returned to this basic point-that the FOIA is designed
to provide access to information about government, not information maintained
by the government about individuals.
The Supreme Court's second principle focused on citizens' legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy. The Court found that when the information sought concerns a
"private citizen" and "when the information is in the Government's control as
a compilation, rather than as a record of 'what the Government is up to,' the
privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) is in fact at its apex while the FOIA-
based public interest in disclosure is at its nadir.2"03 As a result, the Court deter-
mined that categorical decisionmaking was appropriate: "Such a disparity on the
scales ofjustice holds for a class of cases without regard to individual circumstances;
the standard virtues of bright-line rules are thus present, and the difficulties atten-
dant to ad hoc adjudication may be avoided." 0 ' The Court held "as a categorical
matter that a third party's request for law enforcement records or information
about a private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen's pri-
100. Id. at 773.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 761 (quoting Reporters Comm. forFreedom of the Press v. Department of justice, 831
F.2d 1124, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(Starr, J., dissenting)). See also the Supreme Court's own footnote
20 in Reporters Comm., which emphasizes that the act's primary goals are to promote honesty and reduce
waste by exposing government conduct to public scrutiny. The footnote further suggests that Congress
never intended the Act as a means of opening up the government's collection of data to anyone who
has a purpose for it. Id. at 772 n.20.
103. Id. at 780.
104. Id.
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vacy."' 0 5 To the respondents' argument that prior disclosure of the records sought
reduced the subject's privacy interest in avoiding their disclosure,0 6 the Supreme
Court responded: "We reject respondents' cramped notion of personal pri-
vacy. ,107
The Court continued: "We have also recognized the privacy interest in keeping
personal facts away from the public eye." 1 8 The Court cited to justice Brennan's
concurrence in Whalen v. Roe:' 09 " 'the right to collect and use such data for public
purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty
to avoid unwarranted disclosures.' ..10 The Court also cited to an article by Chief
Justice Rehnquist: "In sum, the fact that 'an event is not wholly "private" does
not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination
of the information.' "'111
Finally, the Supreme Court in Reporters Committee held "that when the request
seeks no 'official information' about a Government agency, but merely records
that the Government happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is 'unwar-
ranted.' ..... In short, the release of information possessed by the government
about private citizens constitutes an unwarranted invasion of those citizens' pri-
vacy and therefore is not required under the FOIA.
The Court cited to its decision in Department of the Air Force v. Rose,"' in which
New York University law students sought Air Force Academy Honor and Ethics
Code case summaries for a law review project on military discipline. Although
Rose dealt with a different FOIA exemption-Exemption 6 (the exception for
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would consti-
tute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"), 114 discussed below-
the Court held that it was nonetheless applicable. The Academy had already
publicly posted these summaries on forty squadron bulletin boards, usually with
identifying names redacted (names were posted for cadets who were found guilty
and who left the Academy), and with instructions that cadets should read the
summaries only if necessary. 115 The Court in Reporters Committee noted that in Rose,
All parties, however, agreed that the files should be redacted by deleting information
that would identify the particular cadets to whom the summaries related. The deletions
were unquestionably appropriate because the names of the particular cadets were irrele-.
vant to the inquiry into the way the Air Force Academy administered its Honor Code;
105. Id.
106. Id. at 762-63.
107. Id. at 763.
108. Id. at 769.
109. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
110. 489 U.S. at 770 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605).
111. Id. (quoting William Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and
Effective Law Enforcement?, Lecture at Nelson Timothy Stephens Lectures, University of Kansas
Law School, 13 (Sep. 26-27, 1974)).
112. 489 U.S. at 780.
113. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988).
115. 425 U.S. at 355.
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leaving the identifying material in the summaries would therefore have been a "clearly
unwarranted" invasion of individual privacy. If, instead of seeking information about
the Academy's own conduct, the requests had asked for specific files to obtain information
about the persons to whom those files related, the public interest that supported the
decision in Rose would have been inapplicable. In fact, we explicitly recognized that "the
basic purpose of the [FOIA is] to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny."
11 6
The Court cautioned:
it should come as no surprise that in none of our cases construing the FOIA have
we found it appropriate to order a Government agency to honor a FOIA request for
information about a particular private citizen. . . .[I]n at least three cases we have
specifically rejected requests for information about private citizens." 
7
In sum, in what many commentators have regarded as a dramatic new expansion of
FOIA privacy Exemption 7(C), the United States Supreme Court in Reporters Committee
categorically excluded from mandatory disclosure information about private citizens
that provides no "official information" about a government agency.""
2. The Exemption 6 Context
The Supreme Court's concern with protecting personal privacy and guarding
against misuse of the FOIA to obtain information about private individuals has
not been limited to the Exemption 7(C) context. In United States Department of State
v. Washington Post Co.,"9 the Court considered whether Exemption 6,12° which
provides that the disclosure requirements of the FOIA do not apply to "personnel
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," was in fact limited to medical and
personnel records. Washington Post involved a request for information from the
United States Department of State about whether certain Iranian nationals held
valid United States passports.21 The State Department declined to provide the
information on the basis that the requested information "would be 'a clearly
unwarranted invasion of [the] personal privacy' of these persons and therefore was
exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 of the FOIA.'
' 2
2
The Court surveyed the legislative history of Exemption 6 and concluded,
"'the primary concern of Congress in drafting Exemption 6 was to provide for
the confidentiality of personal matters.' ,,123 Therefore, it is the nature of the
information, not the type of file in which it is contained, that is determinative. "In
sum, we do not think that Congress meant to limit Exemption 6 to a narrow class
116. 489 U.S. at 773-74 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)).
117. Id. at 774-75, 775 n.21 (footnote omitted); see CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 177 (1985); FBI
v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 631-32 (1982); United States Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co.,
456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982).
118. 489 U.S. at 780.
119. 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
121. 456 U.S. at 595.
122. Id. at 596 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)) (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 599-600 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 375 n. 14(1976)).
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of files containing only a discrete kind of personal information. Rather, '[t]he
exemption [was] intended to cover detailed Government records on an individual
which can be identified as applying to that individual.' ,114
In United States Department of State v. Ray,'25 the first privacy exemption case decided
by the Court after Reporters Committee, the Court addressed personal privacy in the
context of Exemption 6, which provides that the disclosure requirements of the FOIA
do not apply to "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' 26 Ray involved
State Department records of interviews conducted by U.S. embassy personnel with
Haitians who had been returned to Haiti after entering the United States illegally.
The State Department released interview transcripts to the petitioner, an attorney
concerned that the returned Haitians were being harassed or prosecuted upon their
return, but redacted the names and other identifying information of the interviewees
to protect their privacy under Exemption 6.127
In its unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court, citing to Reporters Committee and
Rose, noted that the privacy interests of the interviewees must be measured against
"the basic policy of opening 'agency action to the light of public scrutiny.' -128
The Court then noted:
The unredacted portions of the documents that have already been released to respon-
dents inform the reader about the State Department's performance of its duty to monitor
Haitian compliance with the promise not to prosecute the returnees. The documents
reveal how many returnees were interviewed, when the interviews took place, the con-
tents of individual interviews, and details about the status of the interviewees. 129
The Court therefore concluded that "[t]he addition of the redacted identifying
information would not shed any additional light on the Government's conduct of
its obligation,"' 30 and reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision
ordering release of the redacted information.
The Court went on to reject petitioner's claim that the redacted information
was necessary in order to judge the accuracy of the government's interview reports:
We generally accord government records and official conduct a presumption of legiti-
macy. If a totally unsupported suggestion that the interest in finding out whether govern-
ment agents have been telling the truth justified disclosure of private materials, govern-
ment agencies would have no defense against requests for production of private
information. "'
After Reporters Committee, Washington Post, and Ray, federal agencies are not
required under the FOIA to release government information about a third party
124. Id. at 602 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966)).
125. 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
127. 112 S. Ct. at 544.
128. Id. at 548 (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 372).
129. Id. at 549.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 550.
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that does not provide "official information" about the Government's activities,
13 2
or information in government records about an individual, "which can be identi-
fied as applying to that individual." 133 These positions, however, have been ex-
tended even further by federal appellate and district courts. 
13 4
B. LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS
The Supreme Court expounded three principles in Reporters Committee:
(1) "whether disclosure of a private document under Exemption 7(C) is warranted
must turn on the nature of the requested document and its relationship to 'the
basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act "to open agency action to
the light of public scrutiny;" , 135
(2) "that a third party's request for law enforcement records or information about
a private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen's privacy;
,,136 and,
(3) "that when the request seeks no 'official information' about a Government
agency, but merely records that the Government happens to be storing, the
invasion of privacy is 'unwarranted.' ))137
The strength and clarity of these principles have been clearly recognized by lower
courts.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's holdings in Washington Post and Ray [that Ex-
emption 6 was" 'intended to cover detailed Government records on an individual
which can be identified as applying to that individual' ,,138] have produced a
dramatic impact in subsequent cases. In fact, the cases have been read together
to restrict dramatically the release of information about nongovernmental entities
under Exemptions 6 and 7(C).
139
1. The Exemption 7(C) Context
In the first United States Court of Appeals case to explicitly involve Exemption
7(C) and to interpret Reporters Committee, the Fifth Circuit rendered a far-reaching
132. 489 U.S. at 780.
133. 456 U.S. at 602 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966), reprinted in
1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2428).
134. See N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1990); National Ass'n of Retired
Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1805 (1990); Federal
Labor Relations Auth. v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 844 F.2d 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
135. 489 U.S. at 772 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, quoting
Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974)).
136. Id. at 780.
137. Id.
138. 456 U.S. at 602 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966), reprinted in
1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2428).
139. See N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1990); KTVY-TV v. United States,
919 F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1990); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990); National Ass'n
of Retired Fed. Employees v. Homer, 879 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1805
(1990); Halloran v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1989); Federal Labor Relations Auth.
v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Albuquerque Publishing Co.
v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 726 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1989); Wagner v. FBI, No. 90-1314-LFO,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7506 (D.D.C. June 2, 1991), aff'd, 976 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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decision restricting the release of information. Halloran v. Veterans Administration140
involved a series of transcripts produced as part of an investigation of a federal
contractor. Although the transcripts had been released, the Veterans Administra-
tion had "deleted the names of, and other identifying information relating to,
forty-two individuals, i.e., the three unindicted suspects of the investigation, other
persons participating in the conversations, and third parties mentioned in the
conversations, including one federal employee who was not involved in the investi-
gation," as well as "medical information, relating to one person.141
The court held explicitly that "if disclosure of the requested information does
not serve the purpose of informing the citizenry about the activities of their
government, disclosure will not be warranted even though the public may
nonetheless prefer, albeit for other reasons, that the information be released.",
4 2
In the absence of a rational relationship between the information sought and
the purpose of the FOIA, "even a small and potentially uncertain invasion of
privacy engendered by the release of identifying information may nonetheless
be 'unwarranted' if there are no public interests supporting disclosure of the
particular information. ,
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia returned
to the Exemption 7(C) context in Fitzgibbon v. Central Intelligence Agency.14 The
court rejected the district court's ruling that the appearance of a third party's
name in an FBI report " 'is not sufficiently injurious of his privacy to overcome
FOIA's presumption in favor of disclosure.' "14 Rather, the court stated, "[i]t
is surely beyond dispute that 'the mention of an individual's name in a law
enforcement file will engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatiz-
ing connotation.' ,,146 The court concluded: "We have said quite recently that
'Exemption 7(C) takes particular note of the "strong interest" of individuals,
whether they be suspects, witnesses, or investigators, "in not being associated
unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity."' , ,17 The court held that the
information requested would in no way allow "citizens to know 'what their
government is up to.' -148
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed the balance
required between privacy and public interests in KTVY- TV v. United States. 1 In
KTVY-TV, the requester sought the investigatory records compiled after a Postal
Service Employee shot and killed fourteen fellow workers and then committed
suicide in Edmund, Oklahoma. 5 0 The requester claimed that the "public interest
140. 874 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1989).
141. Id. at 318.
142. Id. at 323.
143. Id. at 322.
144. 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
145. Id. at 767 (quoting Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 578 F. Supp. 704, 724 (D.D.C. 1983)).
146. Id. (quoting Branch v. FBI, 658 F. Supp. 204, 209 (D.D.C. 1987)).
147. Id. (quoting Dunkelberger v. United States Dep't of Justice, 906 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (quoting Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
148. Id. at 768 (quoting 489 U.S. at 780).
149. 919 F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1990).
150. Id. at 1468.
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at stake is the right of the public to know how the shootings occurred and whether
they could have been avoided."..
The appellate court, however, upheld the lower court's determination that
disclosing "the names of interviewees and persons identified in their statements
...could be harassing, embarrassing, and, consequently, an invasion of pri-
vacy. " "' The Tenth Circuit rejected arguments that the likelihood of an invasion
of privacy had not been demonstrated and was, in fact, diminished by the fact that
the assailant was dead.' 53 Instead, the Court of Appeals ruled, "the identities of
witnesses and third parties do not provide information about the conduct of the
government."' '5 4 "Because the disclosure of the information could reasonably
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, the district court
appropriately granted summary judgment for defendants on the Exemption 7(C)
issue. ,155
In SafeCard Services, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission'56 the requester
sought information from the SEC relating to that agency's investigation into the
manipulation of SafeCard stock. The SEC withheld forty-four documents on the
basis that they are exempt under Exemption 5 or Exemption 7(C) of the FOIA.' 5'
The appellate court refused to order the release of "the names and addresses of
third parties mentioned in witness interviews, of customers listed in stock transac-
tion records obtained from investment companies, and of persons in correspon-
dence with the SEC."1
58
The court noted that the public interest in the disclosure of such information "is
not just less substantial, it is insubstantial." 59 The court rejected the requester's
justification that this information would provide the public with insight into the
SEC's conduct: "We have rejected similar claims in the past because the type
of information sought is simply not very probative of an agency's behavior or
performance."160 The court continued:
Indeed, unless there is compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request
is engaged in illegal activity, and access to the names of private individuals appearing
in the agency's law enforcement files is necessary in order to confirm or refute that
evidence, there is no reason to believe that the incremental public interest in such
information would ever be significant.161
The court of appeals concluded: "We now hold categorically that, unless access
151. Id. at 1470.
152. Id. at 1469.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1470.
155. Id.
156. 926 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
157. Id. at 1200.
158. Id. at 1205.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1205. See, e.g., Senate of Puerto Rico v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 823 F.2d 574,
588 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Bast v. United States Dep't of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
161. 926 F.2d at 1205-06.
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to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the
ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling
evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is exempt
from disclosure.-
162
Following Reporters Committee, even information regarding alleged arson and
drug trafficking has been found not to implicate the public interest sufficiently to
warrant disclosure. In Albuquerque Publishing Co. v. Department ofJustice, 63 United
States District CourtJudgeJohn H. Pratt ruled that the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) properly withheld records concerning surveillance and investigation of a
suspected drug trafficker. 164 The DEA had investigated Albuquerque nightclub
owner Ken Gattas in connection with suspected arson and drug trafficking.1 65 The
records of the DEA surveillance and investigation were sought by an investigative
reporter for the Albuquerque Tribune.' 66 The reporter claimed that she was re-
questing the information to learn more about the arson charges and the amount
of drug trafficking that had occurred at the club. 67 The DEA argued that the
requested documents contained material that concerned third parties who were
associated with the surveillance of Gattas and that disclosure of this information
would be an invasion of privacy.'
68
Relying on Reporters Committee, Judge Pratt found that much of the requested
information was protected from mandatory disclosure by Exemption 7(C).169 The
court reasoned that "Reporters Committee and decisions in this Circuit indicate that
individuals have a substantial privacy interest in information that either confirms
or suggests that they may have been subject to a criminal investigation. ' ' 170
Judge Pratt observed that the Supreme Court in Reporters Committee had empha-
sized that the FOIA's main purpose was " 'to open agency action to the light of
public scrutiny.' ,17 Even though the plaintiff sought the DEA's records on Gattas
to learn " 'the complete truth about the fire ... and the extent of drug trafficking
at the night club,' ,,17 the court found that this was not sufficiently intended
"to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny" and, therefore, warrant
disclosure. 173 As a result, Judge Pratt refused to order release of the information
and granted summary judgment to the DEA on its Exemption 7(C) claim.' 74
In another recent United States District Court case, Fitzgibbon v. United States
Secret Service,17 5Judge Harold H. Greene, Jr., ruled that disclosure of information
162. Id. at 1206.
163. 726 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1989).
164. Id. at 860.
165. Id. at 853.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 855.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 856.
170. Id. at 855.
171. Id. at 856 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976)).
172. Id. at 855 (quoting Brief of Plaintiff at 2-3 (No. 87-2590)).
173. Id. at 856 (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 372).
174. Id. at 860-61.
175. 747 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1990).
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about a plot to assassinate President John F. Kennedy and kidnap his daughter
Caroline would not serve the public interest. Although the plaintiff, a historian,
sought Secret Service and FBI records regarding an alleged plot against President
Kennedy and his family by Rafael Trujillo, former head of state of the Dominican
Republic, Judge Greene concluded: "Plaintiff expressly states that his interest is
in the activities of the Trujillo regime in the United States as opposed to those of
the United States Government . . . . This is not a public interest within 'the basic
purpose of [the FOIA] to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.' ""'
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia again upheld
the application of Exemption 7(C) on the basis that disclosure of the requested
documents failed to serve the public interest in Wagner v. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. 117 In Wagner, the requester sought information that he believed would support
his arguments that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that federal
agents had conducted a warrantless search of his home. Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer
held that, however important that interest might be, "the purpose of FOIA is not
to support the needs or purposes of the individual requester. . . . The public
interest to be considered . . . is that of the public at large in investigating the
actions of government agencies, not plaintiff's interest.' 7 8 Since Judge Ober-
dorfer believed ineffective assistance of counsel to be purely private, he upheld the
denial of information.
2. Exemption 7(C) Principles in the Exemption 6 Context
Federal appellate and district courts have not only interpreted the three Reporters
Committee principles in the context of Exemption 7(C) broadly," 9 but these courts
have also joined the Court in extending the principles' application to Exemption
6.180 In National Ass'n of Retired Federal Employees v. Homer,"' the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that a mailing list of recently
retired or disabled federal employees is protected information under Exemption
6. The case arose because of a change in policy at the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment (OPM). " 2 Between 1979 and 198 1, OPM had assisted the National Associa-
tion of Retired Federal Employees (NARFE) in recruiting new members by pro-
viding lists of newly retired federal employees. "" OPM stopped assisting the
NARFE in 1982 and subsequently NARFE's membership began to decline. 8 4
Using the FOIA, NARFE requested a list of names and addresses of retired
employees.' 85 The district court had ruled that the list was not covered by Exemp-
176. Id. at 59 (quoting 489 U.S. at 772).
177. Civ. A. No. 90-1314-LFO, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7506 (D.D.C. June 4, 1991).
178. Id. at *8-9 (citations omitted).
179. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
180. Id. § 552(b)(6).
181. 879 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990).
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tion 6 because any privacy interest in such information was minor. '" The court of
appeals, relying on Reporters Committee, barred disclosure of government employee
names and addresses under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) because the release would not
inform the public about government actions.' 87
This court stated that even though the requested information promoted the
public interest by facilitating federal sector collective bargaining, this was not the
public interest that the FOIA was enacted to promote: "unless the public would
learn something directly about the workings of the Government by knowing the
names and addresses of its annuitants, their disclosure is not affected with the
public interest.""'8 Because the release of these lists failed to add to the public's
knowledge about government operations, the court refused to order their release. 89
Homer marked a dramatic new restriction on information that must be released
under the FOIA by significantly expanding the Supreme Court's "official infor-
mation" test in Reporters Committee beyond the Exemption 7(C) context before the
High Court addressed the issue itself in Ray. This expansion is all the more
notable because the Section 7(C) exemption requires that the invasion of privacy be
"unwarranted,""'9 while Exemption 6 requires that the invasion of privacy be
"clearly unwarranted"' 9' and therefore has been viewed by the courts as having
a higher threshold than Exemption 7(C).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia made this
expansion explicit in Federal Labor Relations Authority v. Department of the Treasury,'92
another case involving lists of federal employee names and addresses:
In Reporters Committee, however, the Court made clear that under FOIA the disclosure
interest must be measured in terms of its relation to FOIA's central purpose-"to ensure
that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny." . . .
Although the context in Reporters Committee was the special privacy exemption for law
enforcement records, exemption 7(C), we see no reason why the character of the disclo-
sure interest should be different under exemption 6. 193
The appellate court in Federal Labor Relations Authority held, as it had in Homer,
that the disclosure interest of the names and addresses of federal employees consti-
tutes a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of privacy.'94
In New York Times Co. v. NationalAeronautics and Space Administration,'95 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia again examined Exemption
6 and further expanded the information it protects. The New York Times sought
a copy of the tape of the voice communications among the crew of the space shuttle
186. Id. (citing National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 633 F. Supp. 1241 (D.D.C.
1986)).
187. Id. at 879.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
191. Id. § 552(b)(6) (emphasis added).
192. 884 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
193. Id. at 1451 (citations omitted) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774).
194. Id. at 1451-53.
195. 920 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Challenger and between the crew and ground control prior to the explosion which
destroyed the shuttle. 196 NASA provided a transcript of the recording, but declined
to provide a copy of the recording itself on the basis that the voice inflections
contained on the tape were personal to the astronauts.'97 Rather than any require-
ment that the information be "intimate'" or even "detailed,'" the Court held that
"the threshold for application of Exemption 6 is crossed if the information merely
'applies to a particular individual.' As this court subsequently put it, the threshold
is 'minimal.' "'98
Because "disclosure of the file would reveal the sound and inflection of the
crew's voice,"' 99 the appellate court in New York Times found that the request
sought "personal information," and therefore held that the privacy interests in-
volved must be balanced in subsequent proceedings against the public gain occa-
sioned by disclosure.2 O° In New York Times Co. v. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration,2"' the District Court made that balance. Characterizing the privacy
interest of the families of the space shuttle's crew as "substantial," and the likeli-
hood that disclosure of the tape would contribute significantly to public under-
standing of the operations or activities of the government as "very minimal," the
court granted the government's summary judgment motion and refused to order
disclosure. 202
3. Summary of Lower Court Interpretations
The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and for the
Fifth and Tenth Circuits, together with the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, have relied on Reporters Committee and Ray to significantly
broaden the scope of FOIA privacy exemptions.
In the context of Exemption 6,203 "[i]f the information [sought] 'applies to an
individual,' then it might harm that individual; for that reason it crosses the
threshold, and the privacy interest of the person to whom it applies must be
considered and balanced against the public interest in releasing it."204 When that
balancing is undertaken, "unless the public would learn something directly about
the workings of the Government"20' by the release of the requested information,
its disclosure "is not affected with the public interest'' 20 6 and therefore is not
required under the FOIA.
Similarly, in the context of Exemption 7(C), "if disclosure of the requested
196. Id. at 1004.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1006 (quoting United States Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602
(1982), and Washington Post Co. v. Health and Human Services, 690 F.2d 252, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1982))
(citation omitted).
199. Id. at 1005.
200. Id. at 1009-10.
201. 782 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1991).
202. Id. at 632-33.
203. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
204. 920 F.2d at 1009.
205. 879 F.2d at 879.
206. Id.
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information does not serve the purpose of informing the citizenry about the activi-
ties of their government, disclosure will not be warranted even though the public
may nonetheless prefer, albeit for other reasons, that the information be re-
leased.' ,207
C. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES
The significant new restrictions imposed on the release of information by Report-
ers Committee has been the subject of an advisory issued by the United States
Department of Justice Office of Information and Privacy (OIP) to FOIA offices
in all federal governmental agencies. In the advisory,0 8 the OIP not only offered
the Justice Department's interpretation of Reporters Committee, but also provided
practical advice to all government offices charged with responding to FOIA re-
quests.
At the outset, the OIP noted that "[tihe Supreme Court's decision sets forth
several important FOIA principles, based upon the Act's underlying policy objec-
tives, which clarify the law in this area and should significantly strengthen the
protection of personal privacy interests under Exemption 6 as well as Exemption
7(C). ,209
The OIP continued:
The Supreme Court in Reporters Committee sharply delimited the scope of the "public
interest" to be considered under the Act's privacy exemptions, declaring for the first
time that it is limited to "the kind of public interest for which Congress enacted the
FOIA." This "core purpose of the FOIA," as the Court termed it, is to "shed light on
an agency's performance of its statutory duties." Information that does not directly
reveal government operations or activities, the Court stressed, "falls outside the ambit
of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve."
210
This narrowing of the concept of public interest, according to the OIP advisory,
was "[p]erhaps the most significant of the alterations made by the Supreme Court
in Reporters Committee." 21' FOIA offices were warned that "[t]his new 'core pur-
pose' public interest standard-which is satisfied where requested information
'sheds light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties'-should govern
the process of balancing interests under Exemptions 6 and 7(C)." 212 The advisory
continued:
In making such "core purpose" determinations, agencies should bear in mind that a
touchstone of this new standard is the "operations or activities of the government."
• . . [T]he many items of personal information about private citizens that the government
207. Halloran v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 315, 323 (5th Cir. 1989).
208. Reporters Committee Decided Broadty, FOIA UPDATE (Off. of Info. & Privacy, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Wash., D.C.), Spring 1989, at 1.
209. Id.
210. Privacy Protection Under the Supreme Court's Reporters Committee Decision, FOIA UPDATE (Off.
of Info. & Privacy, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Wash., D.C.), Spring 1989, at 3 (quoting Reporters Comm.,
489 U.S. at 772-73, 775) (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 6.
212. Id. (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772) (citations omitted).
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maintains-the very information likely to be considered for Exemption 6 or 7(C) protec-
tion-tend to, as the Supreme Court said of rap sheets, "reveal little or nothing about
an agency's own conduct."
2 13
The 0IP also noted "that the Court in Reporters Committee rejected the 'public
availability' element of the case in finding a protectible privacy interest in the first
place. In doing so, it firmly recognized 'the privacy interest in keeping personal
facts away from the public eye.' ,214
III. The Central Purpose of the FOIA: A Proposal
A. THE PROBLEM OF MISUSE
The FOIA was designed to protect and advance three goals: first and most
important, ensure public access to the information necessary to evaluate the con-
duct of government officials; second, ensure public access to information concern-
ing public policy; and third, protect against secret laws, rules and decisionmak-
ing. 2 5 These three functions all focus on the activities of the government, not those
of private individuals or organizations. In the words of the unanimous Supreme
Court, "the FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's activities be
opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens
that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed."
216
Today, however, the FOIA has been extended by requesters, agencies, litigants,
and courts far beyond its original purpose. Indeed, the vast majority of requests
under the Act seek no information about the activities of the government, but
rather information about business competitors, opposing parties in litigation, and
the activities of other nongovernmental entities. In fact, the FOIA is used primarily
today to circumvent existing disclosure rules applicable to specific contexts such
as SEC public filing rules applicable to publicly traded companies, or judicial
discovery rules applicable to litigants. Moreover, these inquiries most frequently
elicit information that has not been created or verified by the government, but
rather has been provided to the government by private parties voluntarily, subject
to industry-specific disclosure obligations, or under force of subpoena.
This extension of the FOIA not only violates the purpose for which the Act was
created, but also costs taxpayers the billions of dollars spent responding to requests
seeking no information "about what the Government is up to." The government
tramples the privacy rights and confidentiality interests of individuals and organi-
zations when it complies with requests seeking information about private citizens
and organizations, rather than about the government. Such a use of the Act
circumvents the discovery process in civil litigation, subverts judicial efforts to
213. Id. (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772) (citations omitted).
214. Privacy Protection, supra note 210, at 4-5 (quoting 489 U.S. at 669) (citations omitted).
215. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURcEBOOK, supra note
4, at 37-38; H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 4, at 27-33. See generaly Dickinson, supra note 3, at 197.
216. 489 U.S. at 774.
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improve the speed and efficiency and reduce the costs of trials, and thwarts govern-
ment efforts to collect information about industries, products, and markets. Per-
haps most importantly, this abuse of FOIA seriously delays responses to meaning-
ful FOIA requests seeking information about government activities, the very
purpose for which the FOIA was enacted.
B. THE MISUSE OF FOIA EXTENDED TO ELECTRONIC RECORDS
The costs associated with this misuse of the FOIA increase as more requesters
use the Act to discover information about non-governmental activities and as the
volume of agency records subject to the FOLA expands. Those costs threaten to
increase exponentially, however, if the FOIA is applied to the increasing number
of computerized agency records. The OIP concluded in 1990 that "no develop-
ment in the history of the Act has held as much potential for shaping its contours,
even the very future of its implementation, as that of new technology."217 Ac-
cording to the OIP, the issues surrounding application of the FOIA to computer-
ized records
are perhaps the most complex and challenging issues ever to arise under the Freedom
of Information Act, if not also the most controversial. Their emergence threatens to pose
increasing difficulties in the administration of the Act as the use of "electronic record"
systems becomes more and more prevalent with the passage of time.218
Moreover, the current debate over such an extension of the FOIA focuses on
the possibility that agencies might be required not merely to search electronic
records, but also to provide new and even customized computer search programs in
response to specific requests and to provide information in an electronic format.219
Federal agencies responding to an OIP survey concerning the application of the
FOIA to electronic records reported concern about the impact of such a require-
ment. 220 As the significant majority of requests under the FOIA are inconsistent
with the Act's purpose, these same requests will also be likely to account for the
lion's share of increased costs associated with applying the FOIA to electronic
records and providing appropriate search programs.
As government agencies and businesses increasingly computerize their re-
cordkeeping and reporting systems, extending the FOIA to electronic agency
records is likely to be appropriate and essential if the Act's central purpose-- 'to
open agency action to the light of public scrutiny' 211-is to be accomplished.
But the considerable costs necessarily associated with such an extension will be
multiplied many times if requests seeking no information about "what the Govern-
ment is up to" continue to be honored. The burden on agency budgets, staffs
and computing resources is likely to increase greatly the already lengthy delays
217. Department of Justice Report on "Electronic Record" FOIA Issues, FOIA UPDATE (Off. of Info. &
Privacy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash., D.C.), Spring/Summer 1990, at 3.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 14.
221. 489 U.S. at 772.
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experienced by requesters, thereby further limiting the speed and accuracy of
agency responses to legitimate requests. Moreover, applying the FOIA to elec-
tronic agency records exacerbates the significant invasion of personal privacy and
intrusion into organizational decision-making occasioned by requesting informa-
tion having nothing to do with government activities. Such an extension of the
misuse of the FOIA further interferes with the discovery process in civil litigation,
impedes efforts to improve the speed and efficiency and reduce the costs of trials,
and undermines compliance with government efforts to collect information about
industries, products, and markets.
C. THE "CENTRAL PURPOSE" TEST
The action of the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts to stem
the misuse of the FOIA in the context of the two specific privacy exemptions is
an important first step. In cases evaluating the contours of Exemption 7(C)222 and
Exemption 6,223 the Court has articulated three principles for evaluating future
claims. 22' First, "whether disclosure of a private document under Exemption 7(C)
is warranted must turn on the nature of the requested document and its relationship
to 'the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act "to open agency action
to the light of public scrutiny ... .22 Second, when the information sought con-
cerns a "private citizen" and "when the information is in the Government's
control as a compilation, rather than as a record of 'what the Government is up
to,' the privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) is in fact at its apex while
the FOIA-based public interest in disclosure is at its nadir. ,226 Third, the Court
has held "that when the request seeks no 'official information' about a Government
agency, but merely records that the Government happens to be storing, the inva-
sion of privacy is 'unwarranted.' 227
This dramatic interpretation of the Act's two personal privacy exemptions is an
important step toward limiting the misuse of the FOIA. The force of its logic
applies not merely to disclosures affecting personal privacy interests, but to all
disclosures under the Act. The test for whether a request seeks "official informa-
tion" should be the touchstone for disclosure under the FOIA. Rather than limit
the application of a "central purpose" test to one or more of the FOIA exemptions,
only information that will serve the purpose of ensuring that "the Government's
activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny'" 228 should ever be subject
to disclosure under the FOIA. Under this test, an agency receiving a request for
documents under the FOIA would determine whether it possessed any responsive
documents and, if so, whether those documents shed light "on what the Govern-
222. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988).
223. Id. § 552(b)(6).
224. See 489 U.S. 749; United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541 (1991).
225. 489 U.S. at 772 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976),
quoting Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974)).
226. Id. at 780.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 774.
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ment is up to." If the agency determined that the documents did not, it would
deny the request and an immediate appeal could be taken by the requester.
In addition, the "central purpose" test would avoid the problems created by
the Act's permissive, rather than mandatory, exemptions. Currently, because the
exemptions under the FOIA are permissive, agencies act inconsistently with regard
to disclosing material that falls within one of the nine exemptions. Even when a
court determines that an exemption applies (e.g., that the invasion of privacy
involved in the release of requested material is unwarranted), agencies are still free
today to disclose that information. Under the "central purpose" test, information
providing no insight on the operations of the government would not be subject
to the FOIA and therefore could (and should) be categorically excluded from
disclosure.
The "central purpose" model focuses the light of public scrutiny on agencies
themselves, the FOIA's intended target. This test affords a clear standard, consis-
tent with the Act's purpose, for when disclosure under the FOIA is appropriate.
Agencies and courts today focus primarily on the applications of the enumerated
exemptions instead of on the purpose and body of the Act. It is difficult to interpret
and apply an exemption without an explicit understanding of the purposes of the
Act. Applying the test to the "central purpose" FOIA as the precondition for all
disclosure would refocus attention on the importance of, and reasons for, disclo-
sure. This approach would reject attempts to gain the presumption in favor of
disclosure without first determining that the desired record concerns the conduct
of government. If the desired record is not within the FOIA's "central purpose,"
courts need never decide the application of the Act's exemptions, because the
record itself would fall outside the purview of the Act.229
229. Rather than adopt the "central purpose" test, Congress could attempt to restrict the bur-
geoning use of the FOIA for entirely private purposes by requiring that requesters demonstrate a
"public purpose use" for the requested information. Under such a requirement, requests seeking
information that would inform the public about the conduct of government would be granted, while
requests seeking information on competitors and opposing parties in litigation would be denied. The
difficulties involved in implementing such an approach are many, including the control of secondary
uses by the original requester of information, the transfer of information obtained under the FOIA
from the original requester to another party, and practical and constitutional hurdles to government
requests that would probe the motives of requesters. A motive requirement could be easily manipulated,
much like the early FOIA, to prefer parties with "acceptable" viewpoints or correct reasons for
requesting information. These difficulties related to the implementation of a "public purpose use"
make this approach unworkable.
Alternatively, Congress could more indirectly, but also more efficiently, restrict the private purpose
use of the FOIA by specifically listing in the Act categories of information that are subject to disclosure,
instead of, or in addition to, providing for exemptions where disclosure is not warranted. Through
such an approach, information created or collected by private parties and then provided to the govern-
ment could categorically be excluded from disclosure. Such an approach, however, effectively permits
the government to restrict disclosure of materials that serve the Act's important purpose. This "enu-
merated disclosure" approach could result in denying access to material that would expose agency
action to the light of public scrutiny, for careful exclusion from the disclosure list would provide the
necessary cover for potentially damaging materials. This approach also suffers from the recurring need
to revise the list of disclosable materials, which not only imposes an administrative burden, but also
dramatically limits the Act's effectiveness until the next set of revisions goes into effect. In short, if
the "enumerated disclosure" approach were implemented, the FOIA would be likely to always lag
behind the legitimate disclosure interests of the public.
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The "central purpose" test goes far toward addressing the issues of escalating
cost, invasions of privacy, circumvention of information disclosure mechanisms,
disincentives to provide the government with information, and delay in responding
to meaningful FOIA requests.
1. Cost
The "central purpose" approach promotes agency and judicial efficiency by
providing for an early determination as to whether the requested information is
subject to disclosure under the FOIA. Only if the agency, or a reviewing court,
determines that the documents at issue are relevant to the conduct of the govern-
ment would the applicability of the nine enumerated exemptions and issues con-
cerning fees and fee waivers-the subject of the vast majority of FOIA appeals
today-ever be addressed. By promoting greater efficiency and the speedier resolu-
tion of FOIA requests and appeals, the "central purpose" test would dramatically
reduce the drain on the government's fiscal and personnel resources.
2. Privacy
The "central purpose" approach protects privacy by categorically exempting
from disclosure those documents that shed no light on agency conduct. This is
precisely the result that the constitutionally protected right of informational privacy
requires. As the Supreme Court noted in Reporters Committee, beginning with Whalen
v. Roe230 the Court has recognized a constitutional interest "in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters. "3 After surveying the extensive common law and statutory
protections concerning nondisclosure of information, the Court concluded that its
own decisions on informational privacy "recognized the privacy interest inherent
in the nondisclosure of certain information even where the information may have been
at one time public.""'
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied on
Whalen to afford significant constitutional protection to information about both
individuals and organizations. In Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co. ,233 the court
addressed the constitutional protection for privacy in the context of confidential
documents produced during discovery in civil litigation, While noting the "pre-
sumption of openness"23 4 in discovery and the significant First Amendment inter-
ests asserted by the Washington Post, the appellate court concluded that "[riecent
Supreme Court decisions indicate that a litigant's interest in avoiding public
disclosure of private information is grounded in the Constitution itself, in addition
to federal statutes and the common law."
235
The court of appeals was careful to note that in both Whalen and subsequent
Supreme Court cases, the Court recognized the difference in intrusiveness between
230. 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
231. 489 U.S. at 762 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599).
232. Id. at 767 (emphasis added).
233. 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
234. Id. at 1015.
235. Id. at 1019.
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disclosures only to government employees and disclosures to the general public.236
The appellate court also held that even corporations possess constitutionally pro-
tected informational privacy rights: "In the context of confidential materials not
used at trial a corporation's privacy interest in nondisclosure is essentially identical
to that of an individual."
237
In order to resolve the conflict between privacy rights and the interests in public
disclosure, the appellate court determined that the propriety of a governmental
intrusion must be evaluated by "balancing the need for the intrusion against its
severity." 238 "Indeed, when the intrusion is severe, a compelling interest is required
to justify the intrusion. 'Severe' intrusions include public dissemination of confi-
dential information as opposed to disclosure of such information only to the govern-
ment or other litigants.' )239
In order to overcome a constitutional privacy interest, the government must
show that "a compelling governmental interest in disclosure outweighs the individ-
236. Id. at 1020.
237. Id. at 1022.
238. Id. at 1023.
239. Id. (emphasis added).
Other circuit courts have also sought to balance information disclosure laws and governmental
practices against individuals' constitutional privacy rights. In Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119
(5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the constitutional right to privacy includes the right to confidentiality. Id. at 1127-
28. The court, in determining the constitutionality of a state constitutional amendment that required
financial disclosures by elected officials, recognized that personal financial information falls within
the sphere of constitutionally protected privacy, and therefore balanced the state's interests in the
amendment against the affected individuals' constitutional interest in nondisclosure. Id. at 1132.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explicitly recognized a constitutional right
to informational privacy in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir.
1980). The court held that the interest of an employee in her medical records necessarily implicated
that employee's constitutionally protected right of confidentiality. Id. at 577. See also Walls v. City
of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Personal, private information in which an
individual has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality is protected by one's constitutional right
to privacy. "); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that Nixon
v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977), reaffirmed the constitutional interest in
nondisclosure of personal information), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983); Duplantier v. United
States, 606 F.2d 654, 669 (5th Cir. 1979) (characterizing the issue presented as "whether personal
financial disclosure required by the [Ethics in Government] Act impermissibly intrudes into the
sphere of family life constitutionally protected by the right of privacy"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076
(1981); Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a constitutional right to
informational privacy exists but is not infringed by the subpoena of medical records as long as
privacy protections are afforded); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988), aff'd,
899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a prison inmate had a constitutional right to privacy in
his medical records); Plowman v. United States Dep't of the Army, 698 F. Supp. 627, 633 (E.D.
Va. 1988) (noting that the scope of the constitutionally protected interest in informational privacy
is unsettled); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (holding
that a hospital's policy of allowing chaplains open access to medical records violated the constitutional
right to privacy), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989); Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp. 917,
930-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that a constitutional right to informational privacy exists and
applying a balancing test); Hawaii Psychiatric Society v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1043-45 (D.
Haw. 1979) (issuing a preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of a statute that authorizes
issuance of administrative warrants for medical records because of the high probability that the
statute violated the right to informational privacy). See generally Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The
Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133 (1991).
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ual's privacy interest." 2 4 Because of the constitutional and common law protec-
tions afforded to personal privacy,
[t]he government may seek and use information covered by the right to privacy if it can
show that its use of the information would advance a legitimate state interest and that
its actions are narrowly tailored to meet the legitimate interest .... The more sensitive
the information, the stronger the state's interest must be.2 '
The "central purpose" test embodies the balance required under the Constitu-
tion before the government can disclose information affecting privacy interests.
First, the test forces agencies to explicitly address constitutionally protected privacy
interests. Second, the test only permits disclosure of information concerning gov-
ernment activities. All other information is not within the purpose of the FOIA
and its disclosure therefore fails to serve the legitimate state interest embodied in
the Act. Third, the "central purpose" test categorically exempts from disclosure
those documents that shed no light on agency conduct-documents that by defini-
tion exclusively concern interests other than those of the government and are
therefore more likely to involve privacy interests.
3. Discovery and Other Information Disclosure Mechanisms
The "central purpose" approach would significantly reduce use of the FOIA
to circumvent other mechanisms for both encouraging and controlling disclosure
in specific contexts. For example, civil litigants would not be permitted to go
outside of the discovery process to obtain information about a private opposing
party to which the judge presiding over the case has specifically denied the re-
quester access. Similarly, requesters would no longer be permitted to use the FOIA
to vitiate the balance made by the SEC between, on the one hand, the type, volume,
and timeliness of information that publicly traded companies must provide to
permit oversight by the government and markets and to enable the public to make
informed investment decisions, and, on the other hand, the need to avoid stymieing
industry, inhibiting innovation, exposing trade secrets, and invading privacy in-
terests with excessive disclosure regulations.
4. Compliance
The "central purpose" test would also reduce the disincentive for compliance
with governmental information collection regulations. Presently, individuals and
companies-particularly publicly traded companies, government contractors, and
other persons subject to governmental disclosure rules-know that the information
they provide to the government is likely to be disclosed to third-party FOIA
requesters. For example, even information provided to the government that is
subject to guarantees of confidentiality2 42 is routinely disclosed under the FOIA
240. Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990).
241. Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991).
242. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 203.2 (1993) ("Information and documents obtained by the Commission
in the course of any investigation or examination, unless made a matter of public record, shall be
deemed non-public .... "); Id. § 203.5 ("Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, all formal
investigative proceedings shall be non-public.").
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to third-party requesters. As a result, private individuals and companies face a
significant disincentive not to disclose private or confidential information to the
government, particularly where there is no statutory duty to do so. Alternatively,
private persons may be forced to couch their disclosures in protective, nonrevealing
language, engage in time-consuming and costly procedures to label all confidential
or private information as such, seek confidential treatment by the government,
and litigate against the government in so-called "reverse FOIA" suits to prevent
disclosure of proprietary information. Much, if not all, of this disincentive is
avoided if the government discloses under the FOIA only such information as
illuminates the activities of the government, not of private parties.
5. Delay
The "central purpose" test would reduce the delay experienced by requesters
seeking records consistent with the Act's purpose and contribute to eliminating
the significant backlog of FOIA requests at all federal agencies. Moreover, all of
these issues-escalating costs, invasions of privacy, circumvention of information
disclosure mechanisms, disincentives to comply with information collection
schemes, and delay in responding to meaningful FOIA requests-are addressed
without excluding from disclosure any records that would serve the public's interest
in learning "what the Government is up to."
Disclosure of records that fail to satisfy the central purpose of the Act of opening
federal agencies to public scrutiny is potentially more harmful than withholding
requested information. "Freedom of information" is not simply freedom of acqui-
sition but also freedom from unwarranted disclosure of private information. Re-
cords that fail to meet the central purpose of the Act should be protected from
agency disclosure.
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court in Reporters Committee, Rose, Washington Post,
Ray and other cases has repeatedly asserted that the "basic purpose of [the FOIA
is] to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny" and that determinations
as to whether to release information "must turn on the nature of the requested
document and its relation to 'the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information
Act.' ,,243 "Information that does not directly reveal government operations or
activities, the Court stressed, 'falls outside the ambit of the public interest that the
FOIA was enacted to serve.' "244
In a series of cases interpreting Exemptions 6 and 7(C), the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have applied the "central purpose" test to exempt a growing
scope of information from disclosure under the FOIA. In the Exemption 6 context,
"unless the public would learn something directly about the workings of the
243. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774 (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 372) (1976).
244. Department ofJustice, Privacy Protection Under the Supreme Court's Reporters Committee Decision,
FOIA UPDATE, supra note 210, at 3 (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 775).
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Government" by the release of the requested information, its "disclosure is not
affected with the public interest" and therefore is inappropriate.2 45 Similarly, in
the context of Exemption 7(C), "if disclosure of the requested information does
not serve the purpose of informing the citizenry about the activities of their govern-
ment, disclosure will not be warranted. ,246
Names and addresses of federal employees, surveillance tapes from drug and
fraud investigations, redacted disciplinary records from the Air Force Academy, a
space shuttle cockpit flight recording, investigatory records bearing on the planned
assassination of a President and the failure of federal authorities to prevent criminal
activity by government employees, even information about who is a United States
citizen have all been withheld because they involve private information that does
not serve the purpose of the FOIA. These inconsistent results-reached only after
years of litigation-are the product of a disclosure law that is all too frequently
employed without regard for the purpose for which it was created and for its
widespread and often onerous impact.
"Disclosure at all costs" does not mean disclosure without costs. Whether
measured in terms of expense, delay, litigation, circumvention of other disclosure
laws, or invasion of privacy, the costs associated with responding to the tens
of thousands of FOIA requests that seek no information about the conduct of
government pose an enormous burden on private individuals and organizations,
administrative agencies, and the courts. Those costs threaten to increase exponen-
tially when the FOIA is applied to the increasing number of computerized agency
records.
The importance of public access to government information in a democracy
cannot be overstressed; it is at the heart of the First Amendment itself.247 A work-
able FOIA is essential to guaranteeing timely, affordable public access to that
information. The extraordinary importance of such access argues not only for not
extending access to information that bears no relation to "what the Government
245. National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879, cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1078 (1990).
246. Halloran v. Veteran's Admin., 874 F.2d 315, 323 (5th Cir. 1989).
247. The First Amendment protects free speech, at least in part, because in a democratic society
the public must have all information necessary to "govern." Alexander Meiklejohn has written that
a democratic society that depends on its members to be both citizens and rulers must be open to
discussion about and criticism of government, even allowing for "arguments against our theory of
government." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 65-
66 (1948). The vital importance of self-governance speech has run through many U.S. Supreme Court
opinions. The Court has repeatedly asserted that:
expression on public issues "has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amend-
ment values." "[Speech] concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of
self-government." There is a "profound national commitment" to the principle that "debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (citations omitted); see also Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75(1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,269-70(1964);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
See generalty Fred H. Cate, Defining California Civil Code Section 47(3): The Resurgence of Self-Governance,
39 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1218-25 (1987).
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is up to," but also for affirmatively assuring that the FOIA is not squandered on
irrelevant requests and is available only for vital, proper use.
The Supreme Court's dramatic interpretation of the Act's two personal privacy
exemptions-to find as a categorical matter "that when the request seeks no 'official
information' about a Government agency, but merely records that the Government
happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is 'unwarranted' ,148-is an im-
portant step towards both recognizing the vital importance of the proper use of the
FOIA and limiting its misuse. But its logic and force applies to all disclosure requests
under the Act. The test for whether a request seeks information that "sheds light
on an agency's performance of its statutory duties" 24 9 should be the touchstone for
disclosure under the FOIA. Such a policy protects not only the constitutionally pro-
tected right to privacy, but also important societal interests in the effectiveness and
efficiency of the judicial system, law enforcement and administrative regulations,
the timely disclosure of appropriate information under the FOIA, and the efficient
and cost-effective operation ofthe government. Only when agencies and courts eval-
uate FOIA requests in light of the central purpose of the Act will the FOIA satisfy
its noble mandate of opening federal agencies to public scrutiny.
248. 489 U.S. at 780.
249. Id. at 773.
